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acting as judges in their own cause. This was not the only 
case where a judge stated that a statute giving a man power 
to be judge in his own cause would be void; in Day v 
Savadge (Hobart 85) Hobart CJ stated that such a statute 
'made against natural equity ... is void in itself, for jura 
naturae sunt immutabilia and they are leges legum\
It may be suggested that in Bonham, Coke was neither 
seeking to subject all statutes to a potentially expansive 
judicial review, nor was he simply looking towards judicial 
construction of statutes. Rather, he may have had in mind 
that there were constitutional boundaries which 
parliament could not cross. At one level, Coke appears a 
champion of parliamentary sovereignty, at one point 
calling it 'so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot beo '
confined either for causes or persons within any bounds' 
(4 Institutes, 32). Yet he did set bounds to what parliament 
could do. For instance, it was a maxim of the law of 
parliament that no parliament could bind its successor. 
Equally, 'No Act can bind the King from any prerogative 
which is sole and inseparable to his person, but that he 
may dispense with it by a non obstante' (12 Co. Rep. 18). 
There were clear constitutional rules about the status of 
the king, and the status of parliament. Did this extend to 
the courts? Coke was clear that the courts did not derive
their authority' from parliament: hence parliament could 
not impede them. By this view, the common law courts 
were not to be set above parliament to test and control its 
legislation, but they were to be protected from being 
undermined. We may wonder, il this is true, why Coke 
used the phrase 'common right and reason', and why 
Hobart referred to the law of nature, rather than 
articulating a constitutional view referring directly to the
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courts' customary autonomy. One answer to this may be 
that there were dangers in resting too much on the 
customary or chronological origins of the common law's 
authority. Not only was the history less than convincing, 
but even Coke proved inconsistent. Thus, where in the 
Reports he had sought to show that the common law courts 
existed before the time of Arthur, in the Institutes he said 
that they derived their authority from the king. If he 
sought to defend the position of the common lawyers, and 
their control of the law, Coke did not in the end want 
others to look too deeply at the original basis of its 
authority. @
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The International Criminal 
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The 1998 Rome Statute established an International Criminal Court. 
Is its jurisdiction truly complementary to the national criminal 
jurisdictions?
I n an historic event, on 17 July 1998, at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court held in Rome, Italy, the Statute Creating the 
International Criminal Court (the 'Rome Statute') was 
adopted by 120 nations and opened for signature.
While the US generally supports the creation of a 
permanent International Criminal Court (the TCC'), it 
opposes such a court as set forth in the 1998 Rome 
Statute, as it leaves open the potential for US military 
personnel and government officials to be prosecuted 
before the ICC for the unintended and accidental killingo 21
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of innocent civilians during a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation. Although the loss of innocent 
civilian life in such a situation would be highly regrettable, 
and perhaps even condemnable, the US maintains that the 
conduct would not rise to the level of a war crime or other 
offence within the jurisdiction of the proposed ICC. Thus, 
the ICC should not be permitted to exercise its 
jurisdiction.
The US' opposition to the Rome Statute could be 
construed as an objection to the exercise of the ICC's 
jurisdiction, which directly implicates the principle of 
complementarity. In short, the complementary regime 
established by the Statute does not adequately limit the 
ICC's ability to intervene with respect to matters properly 
within a state's jurisdiction. Stated another way, the ICC is 
not sufficiently deferential to national criminal 
jurisdictions.
A fundamental question facing the drafters of the Rome 
Statute was the role the institution would play with respect 
to national courts. Several state-delegates, while 
supporting the establishment of an ICC, were reluctant to 
create a court with primary or peremptory jurisdiction, 
requiring a state to defer or surrender jurisdiction to the 
ICC with respect to the commission of certain serious 
international crimes. In their view, such action would 
infringe on national sovereignty by limiting a state's ability 
to prosecute persons located in their territory suspected 
of committing international crimes.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Ultimately, the drafters of the Rome Statute decided 
that national courts should have 'primary' jurisdiction. 
Under the Rome Statute the proper role of the ICC is to 
complement national court jurisdictions and 'fill the gap' 
when States fail to comply with their obligations to 
prosecute perpetrators of serious international crimes.
At the same time, the Rome Statute recognises two 
exceptions to the rule of complementarity, authorising 
ICC prosecution despite pending or completed state 
proceedings. The ICC is not required to defer its 
jurisdiction if a state with jurisdiction is either 'unwilling' 
or 'unable' to undertake its obligations to prosecute 
serious international crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. More specifically, the complementary regime 
established by the Rome Statute authorises the ICC to 
intervene when the national criminal investigation or 
judicial proceedings are or were a sham aimed at shielding 
perpetrators from criminal responsibility, or when a state 
is unable to carry out its proceedings due to a 'total or 
substantial collapse of its national judicial system.'
With respect to a State's 'unwillingness' to prosecute, 
application of the principle of complementarity to State 
proceedings conducted in 'bad faith' presents the easy 
case. A more difficult question is to what extent the
principle of complementarity requires the ICC to defer to 
State judgments on questions of legal and factual 
sufficiency, resulting in a decision not to prosecute. For 
example, under the complementarity regime established 
by the Rome Statute, could the ICC properly exercise its 
jurisdiction over US nationals if, after conducting a full 
investigation of the situation, the US concluded that theo 7
alleged misconduct did not constitute an offence under 
the Rome Statute, and therefore decided not to prosecute 
the persons concerned? In such a case, could the ICC 
intervene in the matter anyway if it believed that the US 
misapplied the law? Furthermore, wrhat if the ICC 
concluded that the law was grossly misapplied or 
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the intent to 
bring the persons concerned to justice?
The dilemma is whether the ICC should be permitted to 
intervene only when the evidence demonstrates that the 
state proceedings were not conducted independently or 
impartially (sham proceedings intended to shield the 
perpetrator), or whether the ICC should exercise 
jurisdiction to correct a perceived miscarriage of justice, for 
whatever reason. Whether the ICC may properly exercise 
its jurisdiction turns on whether the ICC may substitute its 
judgment for that of state prosecutors on questions of legal 
and factual sufficiency or other matters involving the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Stated another way, in 
the case of a good faith disagreement on questions of law or 
findings of fact, should a state's decision not to prosecute be 
afforded any deference by the ICC? If not, then the ICC's 
role with respect to national criminal jurisdictions would be 
more analogous to that of a 'super' international appeals 
court, vested with de novo review authority, rather than a 
court intended to complement states with primary 
jurisdiction. If this is in fact the case, perhaps the concerns 
voiced by the US are warranted. At the very least, the Rome 
Statute appears to have fallen short of realising the objective 
of establishing a complementary relationship between the 
ICC and State jurisdictions.
APPLICATION OF THE 
COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE TO A 
DECISION BY THE US NOT TO PROSECUTE 
THE PERSONS CONCERNED
Under the Rome Statute, a decision to investigate and 
prosecute US nationals for the inadvertent bombing and 
killing of innocent civilians during an internationalo o
peacekeeping mission involves a four-step process:
(1) a referral of the situation for investigation to the ICC 
Prosecutor ('the Prosecutor') either by a state party 
or the United Nations Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, or 
initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor proprio 
motu;
(2) acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction by the state 
where the alleged criminal acts were committed (the
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territorial state) or the state of nationality of the 
accused (the nationality state);
(3) a judicial finding that the ICC has jurisdiction; and
(4) a ruling that the case is admissible under art. 17. (See 
Rome Statute, arts. 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19.)
The first three steps in the process do not pose serious 
obstacles to an ICC investigation and the filing of criminal 
charges against US nationals. First, while the US' status 
and influence as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council would make it highly unlikely that the situation 
would be referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security 
Council, any state party that believes that the facts 
constitute an offence within the ICC's jurisdiction could 
refer the situation to the Prosecutor for investigation.o
Upon receipt of a state party referral, the Rome Statute 
affords the Prosecutor wide discretion to decide whether to 
proceed with a formal investigation. Pursuant to art. 18(1), 
the Prosecutor may commence an investigation if she has 
determined that a 'reasonable basis' exists to believe that a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC has been or is being 
committed. Thus, a state party referral to the Prosecutor, 
followed by the Prosecutor's finding diat a 'reasonable basis' 
exists to believe that US nationals have committed crimes 
within the ICC's jurisdiction, is sufficient to commence a 
formal investigation under the Rome Statute.
The Rome Statute also permits the initiation of a formal 
investigation against US nationals even in the absence of a
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referral by a state party or the UN Security Council. 
Pursuant to art. 15, if the Prosecutor concludes that there 
is a 'reasonable basis' to believe that a crime has been 
committed within the jurisdiction of the ICC, she shall 
request authority from the Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed 
with an investigation. Under art. 15(4), the standard 
applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber is whether a 'reasonable 
basis' exists to proceed with the investigation. In light of 
the relatively low threshold required for the court to 
authorise an investigation, an ICC investigation of US 
military personnel and government officials would be 
likely to be authorised by the court.
The next step in the process would be to determine 
whether either the state of nationality of the accused or 
the state where the conduct in question occurred has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. On this point, it 
should be emphasised that even if the US, the state of 
nationality of the alleged offenders, is not a party to the 
Rome Statute nor consents to the ICC's jurisdiction, the 
ICC may still exercise jurisdiction if the territorial state is 
a state party to the Statute (automatic jurisdiction) or 
consents to the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to the 
crimes in the question (acceptance of jurisdiction). Thus, 
in the UN peacekeeping scenario, if the territorial state 
demands that US officials and military commanders be 
prosecuted by the ICC, the requirement of acceptance of 
jurisdiction is satisfied.
Next, pursuant to art. 19, the ICC must have subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case. Assuming that the 
territorial state accepts the ICC's jurisdiction, and the 
investigation involves allegations that war crimes have beeno o
committed, an offence within art. 5, US military 
personnel who were sent abroad would be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.
Ultimately, the critical issue with respect to an ICC 
investigation and prosecution of US military and 
government personnel turns on issues of admissibility or 
complementarity.
ATTEMPTS TO HALT THE INVESTIGATION
After receipt of such notice, the US would have limited 
recourse to attempt to halt or even temporarily suspend 
the ICC investigation. First, pursuant to art. 16 an ICC 
investigation could be temporarily suspended if the UN 
Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, requested the ICC to 
postpone the ICC investigation. Article 16 further 
provides that the investigation could be suspended for a 
period of twelve months, but the request could be 
renewed by the Security Council under the same 
conditions. However, there are several problems with 
using art. 16. First, the Security Council must act under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Chapter VII 
only applies if the Security Council determines that there 
is 'a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression.' Second, a Security Council resolution would 
require an affirmative vote of nine members, including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members. Thus, an 
attempt to suspend the ICC investigation could be vetoed 
by a negative vote of one of the permanent members or by 
the US' failure to garner an affirmative vote of nineo
members of the Security Council.
A second avenue of recourse afforded the US would be 
to initiate its own investigation of the conduct in question. 
After initiating an investigation, pursuant to art. 18(2), the 
US could file a motion with the Pre-Trial Chamber 
requesting that the Prosecutor defer to its jurisdiction. 
However, deferral is not mandated by the Statute. Instead, 
the Prosecutor is vested with wide discretion whether to 
grant the request for state deferral or petition the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to authorise the investigation.
The ultimate test of the principle of complementarity 
would arise if, after the US concluded its investigation, it 
decided not to file criminal charges against the persons 
concerned. The US' decision not to prosecute could be 
based on its reading of relevant legal authority, which it 
determined does not support prosecution of persons 
concerned for crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. In 
other words, US Prosecutors might conclude that the 
conduct in question while perhaps negligent, preventable, 
and even a dereliction of duty by military commanders, 
does not satisfy the elements needed to prove a war crime
23
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as defined by art. 8 of the Statute. In any event, the US' 
decision was based on an honest assessment of the relevant 
law, facts, and evidence, and not made for the purpose of 
shielding the accused from criminal responsibility.
Under the above-described scenario, the issue before 
the ICC would be whether the US' investigation and 
decision not to prosecute rendered the case inadmissible 
under art. 17. If so, the principle of complementarity 
would require the ICC to defer to the US' handling of theI o
matter. If not, the ICC could exercise its jurisdiction over 
US military and government officials despite a completed 
investigation and decision by US not to prosecute.
Pursuant to art. 17(1), a case may be found inadmissible 
for four reasons:
(1) the case is being investigated by a state with 
jurisdiction;
(2) the state has investigated the case and concluded that 
there is no basis to prosecute;
(3) the person has already been tried for the conduct at 
issue; or
(4) the case is of insufficient gravity to proceed.
However, pursuant to art. 17(2), when a case has been 
investigated by a state that has jurisdiction over it and the 
state has decided not to prosecute the persons concerned, 
the ICC may find the case admissible if the investigation 
and decision resulted from the state's 'unwillingness or 
inability' 'genuinely' to prosecute.
Under art. 17(3), 'inability' means that due to a 'total or 
substantial collapse' of its national judicial system, 'the State 
is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and 
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.' 
This provision was intended to cover a situation, such as that 
in Rwanda, in which the state's national judicial system was 
unable to carry out its proceedings due to political turmoil, 
armed conflict, and the resultant damage and destruction to 
Rwanda's infrastructure and governmental institutions. 
Obviously, this provision is inapplicable in the present case.
With respect to whether the US' investigation and 
decision not to prosecute resulted from its 'unwillingness' 
to 'genuinely prosecute,' pursuant to art. 17(2), the Court 
could find the case admissible and not defer to the US' 
proceedings if either:
(1) the State proceedings were undertaken or the 
national decision was made for the purpose of 
'shielding' the persons concerned from prosecution 
before the ICC;
(2) there had been an 'unjustified delay' in the 
proceedings which is inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the persons concerned to justice; or
(3) the proceedings were not conducted 'independently 
or impartially,' and were conducted in a manner
inconsistent with an intent to bring the persons 
concerned to justice.
Assuming that the US' investigation was conductedo o
expeditiously and the decision not to prosecute rendered in 
timely fashion, 'unjustified delay' could not serve as a legal 
basis to support a finding of 'unwillingness' to prosecute. 
Furthermore, under art. 17(2)(c), whether the US' decision 
not to prosecute was made for the purpose of 'shielding' the 
persons concerned would require proof that the 
investigation and proceedings were a sham and conducted in 
bad faith. Moreover, the ICC would have to find that US 
officials had the specific intent to shield the persons accused 
from criminal responsibility and thereby undermine the 
judicial process. In short, the ICC would have to conclude 
that US prosecutors were involved in obstruction of justice. 
Thus, art. 17(2) (2) imposes a heavy burden on the ICC, the 
Prosecutor and the territorial state to prove the case 
admissible on these grounds. It is highly unlikely that such a 
heavy burden could be sustained based on the reasons given 
by the US for its decision not to prosecute.
Finally, the ICC could rule that the case is admissible if 
the proceedings were not conducted 'independently or 
impartially,' and were conducted in a manner inconsistent 
with the intent to bring the accused to justice. A finding of 
admissibility arguably could be based on these grounds.
THE LANGUAGE OF ART. 17(2)
The problem lies with language contained in art. 17(2). 
When determining whether a state is 'unwilling' too o
prosecute based on one or more of the grounds articulated 
in art. 17(2), the ICC is required to consider 'principles of 
due process recognised by international law.' However, the 
proper application of 'principles of due process 
recognised by international law' in determining whether a 
state is 'unwilling' genuinely to prosecute is unclear. More 
specifically, the use of the term 'due process' within the 
context of whether the state proceedings were conducted 
'independently or impartially' is particularly perplexing.
Assuming that the drafters of the Rome Statute included 
this language as an objective way to measure whether the 
national proceedings were conducted fairly with respect to 
all parties concerned, several issues arise. For example, 
what do 'principles of due process recognised by 
international law' say about a Prosecutor's decision not to 
prosecute based on a finding of legal or factual 
insufficiency? On such issues, international due process 
principles are not instructive with respect to whether the 
national proceedings were conducted 'independently or 
impartially.'
Of course, the US' concern is that the ICC could find 
that the national proceedings were not conducted 
'independently or impartially' because the US' 
interpretation of relevant legal authority was inconsistent 
with 'principles of due process recognised by international
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law' (whatever that means). Thus, the ICC might conclude 
that the US' decision against prosecution resulted from its 
'unwillingness' to genuinely prosecute the case. The case 
is therefore admissible and deference to the US' 
proceedings is not required under art. 17 and art. 19.
If the Rome Statute permits such a result, whether the 
ICC is truly complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions must be seriously re-examined. If the ICC 
may substitute its judgment any time it disagrees with the 
outcome in the state proceedings, the role of the ICC is1 o '
substantially more than merely to serve as a 
complementary court and 'fill the gap' when a State is 
either 'unwilling or unable' to prosecute perpetrators of 
serious international crimes. Despite declarations in the 
preamble and art. 1 of the Rome Statute that the ICC shall 
be a complementary court, it appears that articles 17 19 
merely permit a state to prosecute persons who have 
allegedly committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. The ICC defers to state criminal jurisdictions in the 
Jirst instance, but reserves the right and possesses the 
authority to intervene if it sees fit. Plainly speaking, if the 
ICC disagrees with the outcome in the state proceedings, 
it has the final say on the matter. Thus, in essence, the ICC 
functions as a 'super' or 'supreme' international appellate 
court, passing judgments on the decisions and proceedings 
of national judicial systems. In sum, the jurisdiction of the 
ICC is not truly complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions, rather it is peremptory.
deference by the ICC. In other words, the Court should 
not intervene merely because it disagrees with the final 
outcome in the State proceedings.
At the same time the ICC should not defer when the 
state judgment on factual or legal sufficiency was clearly 
erroneous. However, the 'clearly erroneous' standard 
imposes a much higher standard than found in art. 17(2), 
which permits a finding of admissibility if the ICC 
determines that the national proceedings were not 
conducted 'independently or impartially' because they 
were inconsistent with 'principles of due process 
recognised by international law.' Under the proposed rule, 
a finding that the national proceedings were inconsistent 
with rules of international due process, by itself, would be 
insufficient to support a ruling of admissibility. The ICC 
could intervene only if the national judgment on findings 
of fact or questions of international law was 'clearly 
erroneous,' or the state proceedings were conducted for 
the purpose of shielding the perpetrator from criminal 
responsibility. In this respect, the 'clearly erroneous' 
standard affords state judgments reasonable deference, 
which is more consistent with the principle of 
complementarity than a procedural scheme that permits 
the ICC to conduct de novo review of state proceedings, 
and pre-empt state judgments whenever it sees fit. ®
SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The problem, however, is not insurmountable. The 
principle of complementarity should draw a distinction 
between sham proceedings conducted for the purpose of 
protecting concerned persons from criminal 
responsibility, and those where the ICC merely disagrees 
with the outcome. If state officials who conducted the 
national criminal proceedings had the specific intent to 
obstruct justice, or the proceedings were unjustifiably 
delayed suggesting a lack of intent to bring theJ oo o o
perpetrators to justice, the ICC should find the case 
admissible and exercise its jurisdiction. Simply stated, the 
ICC should not defer to sham state proceedingsF &
conducted in bad faith.
Thus, when a state conducts a criminal investigation and 
ultimately decides not to prosecute, the controlling factor 
should be whether the decision was for the purpose of 
shielding persons from criminal responsibility. However, 
in the absence of a finding that state officials had the 
specific intent to 'obstruct justice' by conducting a sham 
investigation or criminal prosecution, the principle of 
complementarity demands that the national proceedings 
should be granted 'substantial deference' by the ICC. 
With respect to disagreements on legal or factual 
sufficiency to prosecute, a truly complementary system 
requires that State judgments be afforded substantial 25
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